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The Government Shutdown – Another Step towards the
Constitutional Precipice
verfassungsblog.de/the-government-shutdown-another-step-towards-the-constitutional-precipice/
The current shutdown of the U.S. federal government is the longest in its history. It began
on December 22, 2018, and at the time of writing (at 28 days), there is no end in sight . It
has now easily outlasted the previous record, of the Clinton vs. Republican-controlled
Congress standoff of 1995 (21 days) over budgeting disagreements, as well as the Obama
vs. Republican-controlled Senate standoff of 2013 (16 days) over the Patient Protection and
Affordable Health Care Act. The two previous shutdowns under President Trump were
minor, over immigration and budget caps (in January and February 2018, two days and a
few hours, respectively). This one concerns Trumps vs. the Democrat-controlled House. 
The two branches’ disagreement lies ostensibly with border security. President Trump has
demanded at least $5 billion to pay for a concrete, sea-to-sea border wall with Mexico.
Democrats have offered a compromise of $1.6 billion towards border security , which Trump
has rejected. The Democratic Party sees the wall as a waste of money and immoral; many
congressional representatives do not see border security as a priority, and even among
those who do (including the sole Republican representative of a borderland state), preferred
options include “smarter” ideas, such as tracking technology and drones. Certainly, the
border “chaos” reported by Trump is not borne out by the facts, unless one records, as one
Texas congressional representative did, the personal crises endured by would-be
immigrants at the border, which would not be ended by a wall.
Yet the disagreement is, to some extent, beside the point; the constitutional implications are
also pressing. There is an intricate backdrop of constitutional and broader public law that
governs such shutdowns and the “funding gaps” that give rise to them. These “gaps” arise in
one of two ways: either as a result of the Congress failing to pass legislation funding
government operations and agencies, or as a result of the President’s veto, after Congress
has passed such a bill. (The latter now applies to the present shutdown.) While many
government programs (such as Social Security) are supported by annual appropriations
acts, shutdowns affect those that rely on continuing appropriations. As I have written
previously, such shutdowns are unique to the check-and-balances understanding of
American presidentialism.  They have a number of causes, including an obdurate
Constitution which did not put its mind to political parties and to their polarization. Other
laws include the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which “impounds” funds absent prior
congressional authorization, and the Antideficiency Act, the earliest version of which was
enacted in 1870, and then 1884, but which was “rediscovered” in 1980. Two influential




the Act as requiring a shutdown of all “non-essential” government functions unless new
spending bills were passed. That history provides an interesting case study of legalism in the
US, yet to be concluded. 
Hence, the current shutdown is partial, and affects 800,000 federal workers, many of whom
who have little savings to fall back on; they and the economy are feeling the pain, with a half
a percentage point of growth already lost. And while federal workers have received some
legislated support, including back pay guarantees, government contractors will not, risking
their businesses and depressing the economy further. The wider and even more disturbing
picture concerns other impacts: the long-term impact of shuttered government on basic
government functions: how it collects data and advances science, monitors environmental
and health hazards, dispenses nutrition programs for families needing assistance, collects
and returns taxes, and attracts new hires. And in two weeks, funding for the federal courts
may be in jeopardy. 
The extensive duration of this partial shutdown is thus of great alarm. Of course, Americans
are no stranger to government shutdowns: they have occurred, to lesser or greater duration
and disruption, on 21 occasions since 1974. They are a predictable result of a backdrop of
constitutional and public law easily manipulated by party polarization. And yet, the present
government shutdown represents a new step forward to the precipice on which Trump is
taking America’s constitutional democracy, which makes it distinctive for reasons not just of
duration.
First, this shutdown occurs alongside major regressions in America’s constitutional
democracy, as Trump continues to reject norms of mutual tolerance and restraint already in
jeopardy prior to his appointment. The culture of congressional politics has long been
“abysmal”, and is progressively worsening. But as Stephen Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have
documented, Trump is a “serial norm-breaker”, who has little concern with small-c
constitutional norms, as well as with the reciprocity and compromise required for
government to work.  This means that the game-of-chicken that is always the basic premise
of a government shutdown, in which the side that ends the shutdown is often the side that
feels the greatest political heat, is already highly distorted. Trump has issued many
falsehoods about the border chaos and the proclivities of federal workers, but alongside
these is the more general absence, in Trump, of any sense that “lying is a disfavored
behaviour”. Given that the narrative of who-is-to-blame for the shutdown is a critical piece
for ending the manoeuvre (although recent polls report that the majority think that blame
lies with the president), the present shutdown appears potentially endless.
Second, even if the shutdown may be thought to involve intransigent Democrats as well as
an intransigent Trump, it is not symmetrical. As David Pozen and Joseph Fishkin have
recently written, ) adapting a term first coined by Mark Tushnet, ) shutdowns are versions
of “asymmetrical constitutional hardball” in which the costs to the Democrats and the costs




fair play, are not equal. With their anti-tax, small government ideals, and the “originalist”,
pre-New Deal constitutional philosophy, many Republicans have a greater willingness to
incapacitate the government. This also makes a more enduring shutdown more likely.
Indeed, the recent manoeuvres to allow more federal workers to function may ironically
prolong the standoff, given that many sources of voter ire will be kept in check. (Democrats
could, of course, back down, and hope for the political costs of an unpopular wall to do their
work in the next election: Mark Graber draws on an 1832 veto involving Andrew Jackson and
Nicholas Biddle to prove the plausibility of this option, which of course relies on voter
sentiment, as well as electoral responsiveness in the first place.)
And finally, the shutdown of government is now bound up in a shrewd escalation by Trump
of the constitutional stakes. Last week, he threated to declare a “national emergency” to
fund his wall; the option has been tempered, but apparently not been discarded. While such
a move would immediately end the shutdown, it would also threaten previously understood
norms governing constitutional emergency. Such powers – exacerbated by the perils of
presidentialism famously described by Juan Linz in relation to Latin America’s democratic
breakdowns in the 1970s  – have been seen as off the table – or expressly repudiated – by
US leaders. If they are invoked under the pretext of border control, they may threaten a
constitutional crisis (as Bruce Ackerman has suggested, noting the federal crimes that are
suggested by this unprecedented move) – or at the very least indicate a vastly imprudent
reinterpretation of appropriations law (as John Fabien Witt has argued.) 
Yet irrespective of whether Trump invokes an emergency power for his wall, each day of
shutdown is a day in which some form of emergency is more likely to arise. A recent
bestseller by Michael Lewis described the under-appreciated role of federal government in
securing Americans from many under-acknowledged – and often catastrophic – risks.  That
book, The Fifth Risk, called attention to Trump’s deliberate or reckless non-staffing of
government positions. Yet Lewis’ lessons about the casual necessity of the federal
government, and the alarm we should feel at its incapacitation, apply tellingly to the
government shutdown. Because of the legalistic separation of “essential” versus “non-
essential” services, the shutdown is clearly skewed to impact these long-term, or hard-to-
appreciate, concerns. A long-term shutdown will clearly cause crisis, somewhere. And an
opportunist Trump, already warming to emergency powers, may seize on it. (By then, of
course, that may not be the greatest of our worries).
These three aspects of the current shutdown – the norm regressions, polarization, and crisis
stakes– all signal a ruthless quest for constitutional destabilization that goes beyond mere
money or borders. Indeed, previous suggestions for averting shutdowns – budget defaults
and other design options – would do little to alleviate the real exposures now in America’s
constitutional system. The big precipice at present is not fiscal, but constitutional. It
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While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click here.
Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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